Last season, Billy Beane, Moneyball icon and godfather of the modern GM, uncharacteristically chased a straight. He attempted to make a run at the postseason by virtue of a strategy completely contrary to that which made him famous. He traded a blue-chip prospect (Carlos Gonzalez) for one season from an impending free agent slugger (Matt Holliday). He signed a quartet of aging injury-prone veterans – Jason Giambi, Orlando Cabrera, Nomar Garciaparra, and Adam Kennedy. He planted his top four pitching prospects – Brett Anderson, Trevor Cahill, Vin Mazzaro, and Gio Gonzalez – in the starting rotation, even though it meant jump-starting their progress towards arbitration. He handed outfield spots to two players with low on-base percentages – Rajai Davis and Ryan Sweeney. Basically, he was the exact opposite of what Michael Lewis advertised way back in 2003.
Except, really he wasn’t. This was Moneyball at it’s core. The approach was different, but the strategy’s essence was the same. Beane was playing against the market. With the economy plummeting, most GMs were reluctant to be aggressive, especially with veterans, so Cabrera, Giambi, and Garciaparra were available for relatively cheap, one-year deals. There was significant statistical evidence that the “Juiced Ball Era” was over, so speed and defense were reaching a new premium. Enter Davis, Kennedy, and Sweeney.
Other teams were becoming more and more reluctant to rush big-ticket prospects to the majors, especially pitchers, because of the cost of arbitration, but that also meant they didn’t always field a team of the best possible players, and left them susceptible to AA and AAA injuries. (Nothing is worse than sending a bonus baby to have Tommy John before he’s ever pitched an inning for the big-league club.) In the wake of the “Joba rules,” the “Liriano rules,” the Zumaya project, and the arrival of Tim Lincecum, dominant from the moment he stepped on the mound right across the Bay, Beane had to be wondering if maybe a bunch of 21 and 22-year-olds could own the AL West, especially pitching in a spacious park like the Coliseum.
He decided, while his competitors (except for the Yankees), were acting cautiously, he would go for the gold. The rationale was sound. The results were abominable. Holliday had the worst start of his career. Same for Cabrera. Giambi was even worse, to the point of being released around midseason. Garciaparra, predictably, spent most of the season on the DL, as did Oakland’s two best incumbent players, Eric Chavez and Justin Duchscherer. The A’s scuffled to their third consecutive losing season with the second worst winning percentage of the Beane era, despite having the second highest payroll of any team he’s ever fielded.
As I said, although the chips didn’t fall the way he would’ve liked, it’s hard to fault him for trying, but I think it’s safe to say, he won’t play his hand that way again in 2010…
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